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Abstract 
The authors of this study concludes that ethics education has a positive 
influence on moral confidence, moral action and the use of ethics resources 
by nurses and social workers.  A crucial limitation of the study is that it does 
not provide any way for respondents to indicate what they understand by 
ethics nor the ethical content of their educational programs, thus we cannot 
properly assess the basis of the respondents confidence about their 
professional and ethical responsibilities. This is reinforced by the possibility 
that respondents’ ethical understandings have been shaped by experiences 
independent of formal education programs.  Moreover, the findings that in-
service ethical training is strongly correlated with moral confidence and action 
are problematic because what counts as ethics, rather than law or hospital 
policy for example, is not elucidated.   
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Grady et al (2008) report on a survey that they claim bears out the hypothesis 
that ethics education has a positive influence on moral confidence, moral 
action and the use of ethics resources by nurses and social workers. We are 
at one with these authors regarding the importance of inquiry into the efficacy, 
or otherwise, of ethics education for health care professionals. However, we 
think that basic features and assumptions of the survey are flawed, and that 
consequently the research cannot sustain the hypothesis.  
Ethics is a complex and internally contested dimension of human life. Much of 
ethics is disputed -  from the scope of ethics itself, through issues concerning 
frameworks of appropriate thought and action, to specific problem areas such 
as euthanasia, stem cell research, decisions regarding good care for patients, 
and so on. Given this, we think that the authors’ survey format is inadequate 
to the task and that a qualitative or  mixed methods approach would have 
been more appropriate for such an inquiry (Pope and Mays 1995). 
Even if one accepts that a survey may be the best means for examining these 
questions, there are a number of limitations to this study that profoundly limit 
the validity and generalisability of the results.  The sample of respondents is 
overwhelmingly Caucasian (83%) and female (85%); there is no assessment 
of the participants moral confidence or ethical sensitivity prior to receiving 
ethics education, and there is no serial or longitudinal analysis that may tell us 
something about how ‘robust’ the reported dispositions of respondents are. 
In our view, however, the central shortcoming of the survey is that the authors 
nowhere provide any indication either of what they take ethics to be or of the 
actual content of the variety of ethics programs encompassed. We are 
informed only that the ethics programs include basic and advanced 
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professional programs, and continuing education and in-house training 
programs. Without further specification of such things as the content range of 
programs, key emphases, types and stringency of assessment, etc, the 
significance of the survey results cannot be established. 
For example, given the potentially wide range of issues available to educators 
(as indicated above) we cannot tell what the respondents understood as their 
‘ethical issues’ and ‘professional responsibilities’ (Grady et al 2008, 8); nor do 
we know what reasons they had for this understanding. Indeed, we cannot 
know whether the formal education programs alone were the primary source 
of ethical understanding for the respondents – as opposed to other 
independent learning (respondents’ own reading, discussions with colleagues, 
life experiences, etc). 
This is particularly relevant to the finding by the authors that respondents who 
had undergone continuing education were more likely to be more confident 
and to take moral action. Without some indication of the content of these 
programs, we cannot evaluate the finding. For example, the in-house 
programs might strongly emphasise local policy and procedures, managerial 
imperatives, legal requirements, etc. This might well account for more (locally 
relevant) confidence and tendency to (locally relevant) action; but there may 
be little that explicitly or directly addresses ethics. 
Without information about the content of the education programs, and without 
independent specification by the authors as to what is central to ethics here, 
we have no way of assessing the implicit assumption that confidence in moral 
judgement, disposition to use ethical resources and likelihood of taking moral 
action are significant criteria of the efficacy of ethics education.  
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To illustrate, the measure of confidence in the survey comprises questions 
regarding confidence in justifying ethical decisions, in preparedness to deal 
with ethical issues faced, and about “professional responsibilities and scope 
of practice regarding ethical issues” (Grady et al 2008, 5). The survey 
depends on self-reporting by respondents. But we cannot tell if a given 
respondent’s confidence in justifying a decision, say, is grounded in some 
demonstrable skill in moral perception and judgement, or simply a sense of 
empowerment through exposure to a formal program and acquisition of 
relevant language. Confidence may, or may not, be justified: it cannot be self-
validating. And without relevant specific information regarding the educational 
base of this confidence, the survey provides no independent way of validating 
the putative ethical significance of the confidence reported. 
The authors acknowledge that the use of self-reporting without a 
supplementary study of actual behaviours of respondents is a limitation of the 
study. Our view, however, is that even if a study of respondents’ behaviour 
was included, this would not improve the situation: the significance of such 
behaviours would be dependent on the significance of the dispositions they 
are supposed to express, and our argument is that this latter significance 
cannot be shown within the terms of the survey. 
The unavailability of information about the content of the education programs 
and the lack of authorial stipulation regarding a minimal ethical core vitiate the 
other findings as well. For example, the authors point to a correlation between 
little or no ethics education and respondents’ lack of confidence regarding use 
of ethical resources in the workplace “…because they did not feel authorized 
or qualified, or found the service difficult to access” (Grady et al 2008, 12). But 
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the survey provides no grounds for validly inferring that ethics education 
would ground a confidence here. Some people may be timid or lacking in self-
esteem – even if they were to be exposed to ethics education; and difficulty of 
access may be as much a matter of inadequate institutional information about 
the availability of such resources, or strict policy on access to such, etc, and 
may have little relationship to ethics education. 
Similar comments apply to the findings on moral action. The authors report 
that the moral action item most  “respondents were likely to take was “Talk 
with other members of my profession”“, and that nurses “tended more often 
than social workers to choose “ feel concerned but take no further 
action””(Grady et al 2008, 8).   Unless we know independently what is 
supposed to count as ethically relevant, we cannot evaluate the significance 
of, say, talking with other members of one’s profession (in regard to some 
concern).  Such action is not self-evidently ethical: many non-ethical concerns 
might prompt such behaviour. 
 The authors nominate concern about moral distress amongst nurses and 
social workers as one factor motivating the survey. Moral distress is 
characterised as a being  “caught between what they think might be best for 
their patients and the institutional constraints or overriding decisions of other 
health care professionals” (Grady et al 2008, 3).  Linking moral distress thus 
understood to the survey’s concerns at least potentially introduces some 
indication of what counts as ethical here: it has to do with practitioners’ 
understanding of what’s best for their patients. However, this does not 
strengthen the claims made regarding the survey’s hypothesis. There are two 
related reasons for this. One, that while there is some credibility in the idea 
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that talking with other members of one’s profession is action oriented to 
patient welfare, it is not clear how this could be a strong endorsement of the 
efficacy of ethics education: such action might be quite common amongst 
practitioners, and may be an expression of (ethically appropriate) professional 
concern uninformed by formal ethics education – even amongst those 
practitioners who have also been exposed to ethics education. Two, the 
survey gives us no way of telling whether respondents’ looking to other 
members of their profession is motivated more by a desire (understandable) 
to relieve their own distress than to improve the situation of their patients. 
If the purpose of ethics education for health care practitioners is, ultimately, 
securing appropriate care for patients, then research into the efficacy of such 
education needs, minimally, to be grounded in hypotheses regarding what 
counts as appropriate patient care, and in detailed specification of the 
education programs in question.  
We have argued that the survey under review here fails to meet these 
requirements. Such research would also need to move beyond self-reporting 
of respondents, and also beyond purely ‘cognitive response’ data – which 
may do no more than confirm successful negotiation of an education 
program’s assessment requirements, and have little to do with outcomes for 
patients. There would need to be investigation of relevant behaviour by 
respondents as well. Moreover, this behavioural investigation would need to 
be sensitive to the different intellectual and practice cultures of the different 
health professions and to the complex nature of health care action, and to 
control for the many formative influences on such action – including the 
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potentially great variety of factors which shape practitioners’ moral stance 
regarding patient care.  
Empirical research in bioethics continues to increase in scope and extent and 
is now a major feature of the ethics literature – particularly in nursing ethics 
(Borry 2006). If empirical research is to make any serious contribution to a 
better understanding of the context of bioethics, the theorisation of ethics or 
the very nature of ethics then it is vital that its research questions are clear, 
methods appropriate and conduct robust. Research that does not have these 
characteristics is more likely to obfuscate than illuminate.  
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